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Introduction 
As C. Everett Koop, MD, US Surgeon General, eloquently put in 1985: ‘Drugs 
don't work in patients who don't take them’.  
Adherence to treatment may be defined as “the extent to which a patient acts in 
accordance with the prescribed interval, and dose of a dosing regimen” [1], while poor 
adherence to medication decreases treatment efficacy and worsens clinical outcomes 
[2]. The assessment of treatment adherence is standard clinical practice in a variety of 
chronic conditions [3,4], however in sleep medicine, measurement of adherence to 
medicines is limited, rather the only routine adherence measured and addressed is 
that to positive airway pressure therapy in patients with obstructive sleep apnoea [5]. 
The phenomenon of non-adherence to therapy, throws up a huge variety of 
philosophical considerations, including ethical and more practical ones. For the 
purposes of this review, in light of our disciplinary backgrounds (a respiratory and 
sleep pharmacist, and a philosopher with interests in addiction), we shall concentrate 
on issues raised by non-adherence to drug therapies in sleep conditions in particular.  
Non-adherence to therapy creates a series of linked philosophical issues. First, 
the difficulty of measuring rates of adherence creates an epistemic problem 
regarding the efficacy of prescribed treatments. Secondly, since diseases are often 
classified as refractory based on apparent failure of standard medicines, the validity 
of this classification faces a similar epistemic crisis. This in turn produces ethical 
issues when therapies are restricted to cases deemed refractory. It also calls into 
question, if the patient doesn’t take the medicines as prescribed, what they do with 
them; and the prospect of potential drug diversion arises. Education of patients 
seems to be of limited help in addressing these issues; what may be needed is a 
revision of the patient-prescriber relationship to move away from blame when non-
adherence occurs. We close by revisiting an ancient debate in the philosophy of 
action which may shed light on what such a revised relationship would require.  
 
Epistemic Issues in Adherence to Therapy 
We know that, for a variety of reasons explored elsewhere in this volume, many 
patients do not adhere to prescribed therapy; but it is difficult to say with any 
confidence how prevalent this phenomenon is. The WHO reported that adherence 
among patients with chronic diseases averages only 50% in developed countries [6,7] 
and recognises this as a significant public health concern due to the impact this has 
on the health of the individual and significant waste of resources [8,9].  
 
Whatever the reason for their non-adherence [10], patients are understandably 
reluctant to reveal it to their doctors. Some, already perhaps sensitive about the 
perception that theirs is not a “serious” condition but an object of fun or whimsy to 
others, will not want their doctor to think they are not taking the problem seriously. 
Others may be concerned about the side effects of medicines, lack confidence in their 
utility or are reluctant to create an impression that they cannot “follow instructions 
properly”, lest they be dismissed as simply lacking discipline and poor sleep hygiene. 
Still more patients are “eager to please” their doctors, and reluctant to admit that 
they find a treatment useless, or encounter side-effects they are unwilling or unable 
to endure for the sake of ameliorating their condition.  
 
Various methods can be used to estimate adherence, though none is much more 
satisfactory [11]. Inaccurate estimation of adherence leads to unnecessary healthcare 
spending when the current treatments are deemed ineffective, therefore adding 
unnecessary therapies or intensifying the original therapies leading to side effects 
[4,12]. Simply counting the quantity of medicine issued on prescription and 
comparing it to the intended dose (termed “medicines possession ratio”, MPR) will 
highlight discrepancies that could suggest non-adherence; a patient prescribed one 
tablet twice a day, for instance, would be expected to be issued with a prescription for 
around sixty tablets every month by their primary physician. But this may still 
underestimate non-adherence, as it does not tell us that the patient had the medicine 
dispensed from the pharmacy, or that upon receiving it they have taken it as directed 
[12]. Interrogations of pharmacy dispensing records are logistically more 
challenging, but nor do they give any more certainty as to whether the patient was 
adherent to the regimen. Moreover, none of these “work-around” alternatives to 
patient-doctor disclosure can tell us why a course of treatment is not being adhered 
to. 
For all these reasons, and others, doctors have difficulty in establishing 
whether, and how regularly, patients are taking their medication. And this lack of 
knowledge, or of reliability at any rate, creates serious epistemic problems elsewhere, 
since it is a presumption that we act based on accurate information. 
Consider, first, our knowledge of the efficacy of drug therapies. This is crucially 
dependent on patients actually taking their medication, from the clinical trials stage 
onwards; if the medicine has not been taken, then no pharmacological conclusions 
can be drawn from the absence of a therapeutic effect. So a process which cannot 
detect non-adherence is fundamentally flawed. Since both adherence and non-
adherence may be partial rather than total [1], and will vary over time (defined 
within persistence), the problem deepens; at what level of adherence do we count a 
given patient as having taken the medicine optimally or not? There is no principled 
basis on which to say that taking 75% of one’s doses is complying with therapy, but 
taking only half of them is not; nor, even taking the threshold to be arbitrary, is there 
any agreement as to the level it should be set at. Often the argument is made that 
adequate randomisation between arms of a study will mitigate against this 
confounder, but it stands to reason that if adherence in a gold standard randomised 
control trial cannot be accurately measured or ensured, the foundation of the results 
is somewhat shaky. 
This is the case in clinical trials, but the same problem applies in trying to 
determine the efficacy of a given treatment for any individual patient; we cannot 
know if the therapy is having a positive pharmacological effect or not, if we do not 
know whether the therapy is actually being taken or not. And this raises a further 
epistemic problem for sleep medicine. Diagnosis and treatment of sleep disorders 
often proceeds by what is sometimes known as “empiric therapy”. That is, the 
treatment process involves the initiation of new medicines, dose increases, etc. in a 
systematic way, until an improvement is observed, and both treatment and diagnosis 
can be deemed successful. But testing drug therapies “by elimination” in this way 
cannot work if the treatment is not taken as directed; the medication has not failed to 
produce a satisfactory therapeutic pharmacological effect if it has not actually been 
taken. And since diagnosis and treatment are bound up together, so that the success 
of a treatment is our best clue to the accuracy of diagnosis, diagnostic reliability [13] 
for the field of sleep medicine as a whole is compromised. 
 
Ethical Issues in Adherence to Therapy 
At this point, the ethical implications of non-adherence start to bite. In any 
finitely-resourced healthcare system, expensive therapies must be allocated wisely. 
Correcting poor adherence is likely to achieve a better therapeutic outcome with lower 
cost compared to adding additional, potentially more expensive therapies [3,6,14]. 
Extensive evidence of this is seen in severe asthma [9,15]. 
 One obvious, standard basis for allocating expensive therapies, accordingly, is to 
limit their prescription to those cases which have been deemed refractory following 
the failure of alternative, more well-known and often cheaper treatments [16]. But 
again, if a course of therapy has not been adhered to, it is inaccurate to characterise it 
as having “failed” in any relevant sense. Hence, being able to correctly identify the 
refractory patients from non-adherent patients is important to ensure resources are 
spent appropriately. 
As an ethical basis for rationing therapy, then, this looks decidedly problematic. 
“Failure” of therapy due to non-adherence by patients may result in non-adherent 
patients gaining preferential access to more expensive treatments, ahead of similarly 
situated patients who might benefit at least equally from them, yet have seen smaller 
improvements by following their previous courses of treatment as directed. 
Potentially more seriously, deeming certain patients’ sleep disorders to be refractory 
on this inadequate evidential basis, and devoting resources to expensive therapies as 
a result, involves an opportunity cost for users in all other areas of the healthcare 
system, to whose treatment the same resources might instead be assigned. 
A rather different ethical concern with non-adherence concerns drug diversion - 
the transfer of any legally prescribed controlled substance from the individual for 
whom it was prescribed to another person for any illicit use. The typical drugs 
prescribed for sleep disorders – modafinil, methylphenidate, dexamphetamine, and 
sodium oxybate, for instance – have well-known illicit uses. So since there is 
evidence that such drugs are being dispensed to patients who do not go on to use 
them, there is a concern that they are being used by individuals other than the 
patient [17].  
This is a problem in its own right; the over-prescription of drugs, which then go 
on to be abused by individuals other than the intended patient, has been a major 
driver of the opiate addiction epidemic in the US in recent decades. But attempts to 
address this sort of drug diversion, and its contribution to drug abuse, are likely only 
to exacerbate what we have identified as the basic issue from which most of the 
problems discussed here stem; the reluctance of patients to admit to their physicians 
that they have not adhered to the therapy prescribed, coupled with potentially 
creating fear of addiction to these therapies, further affecting adherence. 
The fundamental moral problem posed by non-adherence to therapy, then, 
concerns the doctor-patient relationship, and the erosion of the patient’s capacity to 
confide in their doctor and the doctors capacity to trust. The solution to this, and 
therefore a first step towards solving the other problems we have discussed here, 
seems – perhaps somewhat paradoxically – to lie in de-moralising that relationship. 
That is, a basis must be found for that relationship which treats non-adherence 
neither as a ground for blame on the doctor’s side, nor for guilt on the patient’s. Non-
adherence to medicines should be an observation, not a criticism. And the key to that 
basis may be found in an ancient debate in the philosophy of action. 
 
Akrasia and Adherence 
According to Socrates, it is impossible for us to act in ways we know we 
shouldn’t; to deliberately follow some course of action just is by definition to regard 
that as the best course of action to follow, all things considered [18,19]. But this has 
seemed false to many people since then; we are all, surely, familiar with the feeling of 
knowing that we should really go for a walk, but nevertheless remaining on the 
couch, or knowing that we should get up in the morning, but hitting the snooze 
button on our alarm-clocks instead. 
An early critic of this view was Aristotle, who drew a distinction between our 
reason and our appetites. When somebody is eudaimon, or flourishing, their reason 
and their appetites are aligned. But when their character as a practical agent has not 
been fully or properly formed, or is temporarily out of kilter, they may find their 
appetites and reason to pull in different directions; they may display akrasia or 
weakness of will (literally “incontinence”). That is, the majority of our failures to act 
as we should do not arise from a failure to understand or care sufficiently about what 
we ought to do; rather, they are failures of action, whereby we know perfectly well 
what we ought to do, but find ourselves unable to overcome our desires and 
inclinations in order to carry it out [20,21]. 
Understanding non-adherence to treatment as akrasia – as a failure of action – 
has the potential, we suggest, to re-orient the doctor-patient relationship in a less 
judgemental and therefore more open and honest way, thereby helping to remedy the 
problems we identified above. Two aspects in particular stand out as worthy of 
attention in this regard. 
First, understanding non-adherence as an akratic failure of action means that it 
does not necessarily result from the patient lacking information. It should therefore 
come as little surprise that attempts to “educate” patients into adherence by 
providing more information about their treatment have often proved unsuccessful; 
the primary effect of such efforts may be to embarrass and alienate patients by 
making them feel ignorant or that the physician regards them in that way. In such 
circumstances, we cannot expect candour in response to queries about their 
adherence to therapy. 
Second, understanding non-adherence as an akratic failure of action means that 
it does not result from a patient having the wrong values, or failing to regard their 
treatment as sufficiently important. Non-adherent patients are not, and should not 
feel themselves to be, bad or lazy people, or in possession of bad priorities. Again, a 
patient who feels that this is the conclusion to be drawn from their non-adherence, or 
at any rate that it is the conclusion their doctor will draw, is not likely to be 
forthcoming about it when the doctor asks. It is perfectly reasonable that a patient 
takes their medicines as advised initially, but upon experiencing adverse effects or 
indeed, no effect, makes the correct decision to not take further doses. The failure 
here is in this decision not being communicated to the physician or indeed where this 
course of action is inappropriate, that the prescriber has not set realistic expectations 
for the patient with respect to its potential benefits and onset of action. We therefore 
propose that an honest admission of the action of non-adherence (by prescriber and 
patient) is the key to improving medicines use. 
 
Conclusion 
Recognising non-adherence as a common phenomenon in medicine allows the 
prescriber to better anticipate it and ultimately address it. Reliably identifying non-
adherence can be difficult, as the objective measures we have are flawed, and 
unfortunately do not help us to understand the reasoning behind this behaviour. Our 
greatest hope is to appreciate the nature of the patient’s decision-making when non-
adherence occurs; using insights from the philosophy of action, we may be able to 
potentially ameliorate non-adherence by better understanding the reasons that 
patients fail to persist with courses of treatment. In this way, both the temptation to 
blame patients for non-adherence, and patients’ own sense of being blamed or to 
blame, can be reduced, hopefully resulting in more honest and trusting patient-
physician relationships, and a much more accurate sense of when non-adherence is 
occurring and why. 
  
 
Key points:  
*  Non-adherence to therapy in sleep medicine creates epistemic problems regarding 
the efficacy of prescribed treatments, and the validity of disease-classification. 
* These epistemic problems create ethical ones, concerning the rationing of therapy 
and potential drug diversion. 
* Alleviating these problems requires getting patients to disclose non-compliance to 
their physicians, which involves a revised understanding of the patient-physician 
relationship. 
* The key to such a revised understanding may lie in an ancient debate in the 
philosophy of action, concerning the ways that practical agents may fail to act in 
accordance with what they know to be the best course of action. 
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